Photo courtesy of the Marine Corps Archives and Special Collections Marines struggle to lift a fallen comrade up and over a blockade during thebattle for Tarawa.

Leave it to the Marines to prove the enemy wrong. That’s what Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief Pacific did when he delegated the 2nd Marine Division to assault Tarawa on Nov. 20, 1943, according to ‘‘Tarawa 1943: Turning of the Tide” by Derrick Wright.

Tarawa actually refers to the chain ofislands in the atoll that lie in the GilbertIslands. Betio was the actual name of the island.

The attack, named Operation Galvanic, was part of the island hopping campaign because the Americans needed the airfield on the island to keep a life line to Pearl Harbor. Tarawa was also needed as a jumping off point to take the Marshall Islands, which was needed to take the Marianna Islands, which was needed to take Iwo Jima, which put the Americans at Imperial Japan’s doorstep.

The assault also proved the soundness and validity of the Marine Corps’ amphibious doctrine. Approximately 500 pillboxes manned by the Japanese version of the Marines, the Special Naval Landing Forces, marked the first time the Americans attacked a highly fortified beach. Though the Americans outnumbered the Japanese 20,000 to 3,000, the defenders proved to be no pushover.

Before the Marines attacked, destroyers and aircrafts bombarded the island. ‘‘We do notintend to neutralize the island, we do notintend to destroy it, we will obliterate it,” said one admiral. Later it would be found that many of the Japanese defenses wereuntouched. Since the destroyers were so close to the island, they fired at low trajectory and a majority of the shells bounced off the surface and landed in the sea beyond.

Second Marine Regiment, under the command of Maj. Gen. Julian Smith, hit the North beach at 9 a.m. The Japanese had expected the Americans to attack from the south because the deeper waters would allow boats to ride to shore. The Americans instead chose the north because, although a reef acted as a natural barrier, the Americans could use the tide to ride over the reef and land on the better suited beaches. The north beaches were split into three sections: Red 1, Red 2 and Red 3. Once the Japanese learned of the Marines plans they scrambled to reconcentrate their weapons on the north beaches.

Nothing ever seems to go to plan. On the morning the assault took place, there was no tide and the Higgins boats were caught at the reef. The Marines were left with no choice but to wade 800 yards to shore in three feet of water, as the Japanese sprayed bullets down range. Some companies in the first wave lost 50 percent of its strength in the first half-hour of the attack.

This was the first time amtracs, a track-driven vehicle mounted with armor and a .50-caliber machine gun, were used in an amphibious assault. Tracks propelled the mini tanks through the water and pulled the vehicle over the reef. They proved versatile, but they were heavily targeted by the Japanese and, with an unarmored gas tank, they proved to be easily combustible. The fire was so intense that it pushed many of the amtracs further west, where they met a five-foot sea wall that thevehicles couldn’t overcome.

Other amtracs were destroyed or disabled before they got to the beach. When Lt. Col. Amey’s amtrac was entangled in barbed wire 200 yards from the shore he ordered his men out and said, ‘‘Come on — these bastards can’t stop us!” Some of the amtracs did make it to the beaches and Marines were able to destroy machine gun nests with .50-caliber fire and well-aimed grenade throws.

A headquarters was finally established on Red Beach 2 at 10:30 a.m. by Col. David Shoup, the field commander. With many of the radios destroyed in the landing, Shoup deployed runners to communicate with the battalion and company commanders.

By 11:30 a.m. the first reserves were called in to support Red Beach 3. By now the Japanese had perfected the range on their weapons, and they destroyed most of the oncoming reserve unit.

In the confusion of the afternoon a dozen Sherman M4-A2 medium tanks made it to shore. These vehicles were mounted with three-inch cannons that would prove to be vital in the coming engagements.

The pendulum of the battle swung in favor of the Americans when a Marine spotted a group of Japanese officers. Naval gunfire obliterated the officers. Unknown to the Marines, Shibasaki and his entire staff were killed while they were in route to change their command headquarters. With the Japanese forces’ leader gone, the enemy failed to mount a counterattack on the first night that might have decimated the Marines.

In the following days the surviving Marines had to deal with the overwhelming stench of thousands of decomposing bodies. It was a memory many of the Marines would never forget.

The final 2nd Marines reserve unit wasdeployed on the morning of D-Day+1 to support the mission of reaching the far side of Betio so the Japanese forces would be split in two. Grumman F6F Hellcats, the preferred naval aircraft in the second half of World War II, came from the carriers and dropped 500 pound bombs to help clear the way. Almost down to 50 percent strength and under equipped due to losses in the landing the Marines pushed on. They were met by a counterattack from the east flank.

By the end of the second day the Marines had not reached the far shore of Betio, because they were halted at the airfield. The greatest achievement of the day was that Marines cleared the west Green Beach, which allowed the 6th Marines Regiment, who were waiting in reserve, to land. Shoup gave a status report for the day saying, ‘‘Casualites many, percentage dead not known, combat efficiency — we are winning.”

On the third day, 6th Marines Division pushed eastward across the island, while first battalion assaulted a Japanese stronghold at the conjunction of Red 1 and Red 2. This ‘‘pocket,” as it became known, would prove tougher than thought to destroy and would be the last stronghold to be taken. Simultaneously 2nd battalion was securing the airfield which was finally done when the Marines scared the Japanese from a concrete shelter by throwing grenades down the ventilator pipes.

As the Marines victory seemed to beinevitable, the Japanese chose suicide over capture. Many would place the rifle muzzle under their chin and pull the trigger with their big toe.

The following morning at 3 a.m., a large banzai attack occurred where Japanese forces emerged from the darkness and flung grenades, fired their weapons wildly and yelled obscenities at the Marines. The morning sunrise revealed more than 200 Japanese dead. The Marines suffered nearly the same number of causalities

The fourth day was met with little resistance except for at the ‘‘pocket.” The concrete pillbox was pummeled by constant artillery bombardment. By noon the American flag had been raised on Betio. The battle was over in 76 hours. Only Japanese stragglers who had swam to nearby islands to escape were left, but they were eventually found.

The battle proved the validity of theamphibious doctrine and was the model on which future amphibious landings would be based. It proved the combat worth of theMarine Corps in World War II and cemented its place in the Marine Corps’ legacy.

— Correspondent: jahn.kuiper@usmc.mil