The business, or dare I say obsession, of keeping the United States Navy on the cutting edge of tactics, innovation and strategy requires hearing hard critiques of practices and attitudes that saddle the effectiveness of our Navy as a fighting force. Constructive criticism, playing devil’s advocate and adding realism to the vulnerabilities of our Navy should not be viewed in a light of failure, but as an opportunity to undertake corrections that may one day save the fleet.

Roger Thompson has spent decades thinking about military culture and the bureaucracy that hampers effectiveness. He has reduced his commentaries, questioning aspects of how the U.S. Navy conducts itself, into a single volume. This book is not for those with delusions of invincibility. It takes a realistic look at adversaries both conventional and asymmetric that could undermine if not defeat U.S. Navy combat platforms.

He opens the book by criticizing military exercises that call foul when another team defeats the ‘‘blue” team (our side) using unconventional tactics. He explains how a Canadian submarine, during an exercise, was able to slip under a U.S. carrier battle group escort screen, and the reaction of denial that resulted, instead of embracing the results to learn from a close ally. Soon after, the Chinese conducted a similar tactic on the USS Kitty Hawk (CV 64). Imagine if the Canadian results had been taken to heart vice dismissed, and used to develop counter-measures based on analysis of the results?

Thompson argues that today’s diesel subs are quieter and outfitted with Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) System, which allow it to linger for two weeks without resurfacing. In addition, the book argues that the United States has allowed its mine counter-measure warfare capability to deteriorate. He is critical of the Navy culture that embraces technology to the point that innovative tactics from an adversary are ignored.

The author minces no words about the ‘‘up” or ‘‘out” promotion system that creates risk-aversion while attempting to acquire an impossible perfection in all things. Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s view of the promotion conundrum is different from Thompson’s in that he sees it as wasteful to rid ourselves of valuable knowledge and experience the military has spent time cultivating in its personnel.

The book ends with 12 suggestions that include learning from best practices of other navies and restoring mine counter-measure warfare capabilities to a level commensurate to a great power. One may disagree with Thompson’s observations and recommendations, however, for those passionate about our Navy, it is necessary to read criticism that is constructive and offers readers a way to reflect on how to solve problems that undermine the United States Navy.

Editor’s Note: Lt. Cmdr. Aboul-Enein is an Arabic linguist and Middle East Analyst. From 2002 to 2006, he served as Middle East Advisor and Country Director at the Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.